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PROOF OF NON-INTEREST IN
REPRESENTATION DISPUTES: A BURDEN
WITHOUT REASON
Calvin William Sharpe*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (OPECBA)1
contains unique provisions governing the establishment of a collective
bargaining relationship between a public employer and a labor organization representing its employees. 2 A significant controversy which surfaced during the OPECBA's first year of operation concerns a petitioning employer's burden of demonstrating a question of representation in
order to secure an election conducted by the State Employment Relations Board (SERB) pursuant to section 4117.07(A)(2) of the
OPECBA.3

In Ohio, SERB may certify public sector unions through official

elections or voluntary recognition. 4 The OPECBA permits a union to
obtain voluntary recognition by filing a request with an employer 5 for
recognition as exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of employees.6 This request must allege that a "majority of the employees in
the bargaining unit wish to be represented by the employee organization, and [be supported] with substantial evidence [demonstrating ma-

* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School. B.A., Clark
College (1967); J.D., Northwestern University School of Law (1974). Member, Illinois Bar. I
would like to thank my colleague, Roger I. Abrams, for valuable comments on an earlier draft of
this article. Gregory V. Mersol provided helpful research assistance. Preparation of this article
was made possible by a grant from the Case Western Reserve University Law School.
1. Act of July 6, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-238 to -246 (Baldwin) (codified at
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.23 (Page Supp. 1984)).
2. For example, no other comprehensive public sector statute has a provision that permits
certification on the basis of union authorization cards if an employer does not file an election
petition when confronted with a request for voluntary recognition. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4117.05(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-3-03 (1984).
3. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
4. Id. § 4117.05(A). Besides Ohio, only Minnesota and Pennsylvania permit certification of
the collective bargaining representative by means other than an officially supervised secret ballot
election. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.12(2) (West Supp. 1985) (certification by joint request of the
employer and majority union); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 95.11 (Purdon 1964) (certification by
joint request of the employer and majority union).
Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), private sector unions may be certified by the National Labor Relations Board only through officially-supervised elections. 29 'U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(1) (1982).
5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
6. Id.
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jority support]
. . ."' Under section 4117.05(A)(2), when the employer receives the union's request, it must either request an election
within twenty-one days, 8 or post notice of the union's recognition request in each facility as well as notify SERB of the union's request.9 If
the employer does not file a timely election petition and there are no
other objections to voluntary recognition, 0 SERB will certify the union
as the collective bargaining representative on the twenty-second day after the union's filing of the request for recognition."
Procedures for handling election petitions are contained in section
4117.07 of the OPECBA.'2 SERB is required to investigate election
petitions filed by an employee, a group of employees, an individual, or a
union claiming that at least thirty percent of the employees in an appropriate unit want to be represented by a union.1 3 SERB is also required to investigate election petitions filed by an employer claiming
that one or more unions have presented a claim for recognition." If
SERB has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation
.

Id. See also OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-3-01(A)(3) (1984).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
Id. § 4117.05(A)(2). Section 4117.05 provides that the public employer, upon receipt of a
for voluntary recognition, may:
(a) Post notice in each facility at which employees in the proposed unit are employed,
setting forth the description of the bargaining unit, the name of the employee organization
requesting recognition, and the date of the request for recognition, and advising employees
that objections to certification must be filed with the state employment relations board not
later than the twenty-first day following the date of the request for recognition;
(b) Immediately notify the state employment relations board of the request for
recognition.
Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(a)-(b).
10. Possible objections to voluntary recognition which can be raised pursuant to §
4117.05(A)(2) are as follows:
(ii) Substantial evidence based on, and in accordance with, rules prescribed by the
board demonstrating that a majority of the employees in the described bargaining unit do
not wish to be represented by the employee organization filing the request for recognition;
(iii) Substantial evidence based on, and in accordance with, rules prescribed by the
board from another employee organization demonstrating that at least ten percent of the
employees in the described bargaining unit wish to be represented by such other employee
organization; or
(iv) Substantial evidence based on, and in accordance with, rules prescribed by the
board indicating that the proposed unit is not an appropriate unit pursuant to section
4117.06 of the Revised Code.
Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(ii)-(iv). See also OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-3-02 (1984).
II. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b) (Page Supp. 1984).
12. Id. § 4117.07.
13. Id. § 4117.07(A)(1). For comparison, it should be noted that exclusivity is awarded a
majority "representative" within the meaning of § 9(a) of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1982). A "representative" is defined as any "individual" or "labor organization." Id. § 152(4).
Since individuals may act as representatives under § 9(a) of the NLRA, such persons have petitioning rights under § 9(c)(1)(A). Id. § 159(a), (c)(l)(A).
14.. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
7.
8.
9
request
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exists, it will order a hearing upon notice to the parties. 15 Upon finding
the existence of a question of representation at the hearing, SERB will
direct an election and certify its results. 6 Implicitly, if SERB does not
17
find a question of representation, it will not direct an election.
In the case of a union seeking to test its majority status in an
election, the union cannot secure an election that may lead to certification, when no question of representation exists.1 8 The consequence to an
employer who cannot show a question of representation when confronted with a request for voluntary recognition is union certification
without an opportunity to test the union's asserted majority status
through a SERB-conducted election. 9
To secure a SERB direction of election, the employer must overcome two obstacles created by section 4117.07(A)(2). First, to secure a
hearing, the employer must demonstrate that there is "reasonable
cause to believe" that a question of representation exists.2 0 Second, to
secure an election, the employer must prove at the hearing that an actual question of representation exists. 21 The filing of an employer petition for election meets the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement
that triggers a SERB hearing pursuant to section 4117.07(A)(2). 2 2 It
does not, however, establish the actual question of representation.2 3
Rather, when the employer does not object to the unit requested and
wants only to test the union's majority status, SERB has interpreted
sections 4117.05(A)(2) and 4117.07(A)(2) together as imposing a burden on the employer of proving at the hearing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the union's majority claim is without foundation.2 4

15. Id. § 4117.07(A)(2).
16. Id.
17. See id.; OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-5-05(C) (1984).
18. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
19. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b). See also OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-5-05 (1984); Franklin
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1308 (1984). On April 1, 1985,
a colloquium was held at the Case Western Reserve University Law School to commemorate the
first anniversary of the OPECBA's effective date. Following formal presentations by Chairman
Arvid Anderson of the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining, Professor Andria S. Knapp
of the University of Pittsburgh Law School, James O'Reilly, author of Ohio Public Employee
Collective Bargaining, and SERB Chairman Jack G. Day, discussions transpired between members of the audience and the panelists. The panelists addressed impasse resolution, unit determination, voluntary recognition, and other issues arising during SERB's first year. The entire colloquium' proceedings have been published in the Case Western Reserve Law Review. See Day,
Report from SERBIA, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 353 (1986).
20. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
21. Id.
22. Franklin School Dist., 1 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 1308, at VII-235.
23. Id.
24. Id. It should be noted that such a showing would establish an objection to the question
of representation request-a separate ground for postponing certification pursuant to § 4117.05.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(ii) (Page Supp. 1984). See also OHIO ADMIN.
Published
by eCommons, 1985
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SERB Chairman Jack G. Day has indicated that this burden entails
proving that "there is in fact a representation issue-that there is not
[majority support for the union]. '"25 SERB will certify the union as a
collective bargaining representative without an election if the employer
fails to meet this burden and raises no question concerning the appro26
priateness of the bargaining unit.
If the employer does not object to the union's proposed unit and
wishes only to test the union's majority status through a SERB-conducted election, the burden of proving the insubstantiality of the
union's claim of majority status under SERB's interpretation is likely
to be quite difficult. The employer is denied access to the union's documentary evidence of majority support under SERB's rules and regulations.2 7 This benign rule regards the confidentiality of such evidence as
essential to the preservation of employee free choice. 28 Thus, the best
evidence of a suspect majority claim is insulated from discovery by the
employer. Other means of testing majority support, such as polling employees, tend to expose the employer to the risk of unfair labor practice
29
liability.
To resolve this Scylla and Charybdis dilemma for the employer,
SERB Chairman Day has suggested that section 4117.05(A)(2) be
amended to eliminate all references to a section 4117.07(A)(2) election.3 0 He argues that protecting the union authorization cards from
disclosure and giving the employer a realistic opportunity to challenge
the union's status, where there is doubt, are both worthy objectives. 1

CODE § 4117-3-02 (1984). It is contended here that a showing of lack of union majority support
goes considerably beyond what is required to establish a question of representation pursuant to the
statute.
25. Knapp, O'Reilly & Sharpe, Discussion: Unit Determination, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
471, 478 (1986) (response by SERB Chairman Jack G. Day).
26. Franklin School Dist., I OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP)
1308, at VII-235.
27. OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 4117-3-03(A) (1984). Under § 4117-3-03(A), documentation of a
union's majority support is to be filed with the Board only. Id.
28. Day, supra note 19, at 372; Knapp, O'Reilly & Sharpe, supra note 25, at 478-79. See
NLRB v. J. 1. Case Co., 201 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1953), which held that requiring a union to
present formal proof of a claim of representation at a representation hearing "would violate the
long-established policy of secrecy of the employees' choice in such matters." Id. at 600.
29. Section 4117.11 (A)(1) proscribes employer interference or coercion of employees in the
exercise of their self-organizational rights under Chapter 4117. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4117.1 (A)(I) (Page Supp. 1984). Interrogation has long been recognized as a form of coercion
in the private sector. See Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967). A similar proscription
is contained in the OPECBA. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11 (Page Supp. 1984). The

National Labor Relations Board has held, however, that certain polling practices are lawful, provided they meet certain criteria and take place prior to the filing of an election petition. Struksnes, 165 N.L.R.B. at 1063.
30. See Day, supra note 19, at 372-73. Knapp, O'Reilly & Sharpe, supra note 25, at
477-78.
31.
Day, supra note 19, at 372-73.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/3
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Chairman Day points out that an amendment would accomplish both
purposes by continuing the present practice of nondisclosure while allowing the employer to secure an election by simply filing a petition.32
Where the employer has doubt, it has a legitimate interest in knowing
whether its employees want to be represented by a union. Similarly, the
union has an interest in determining whether it really enjoys majority
support. An early election would serve both interests. Conversely, after
a union claims majority support under section 4117.05(A)(2), it cannot
legitimately oppose the testing of this claim in a SERB-conducted election.3 3 Chairman Day concludes his argument with the observation that
the objective of section 4117.05(A)(2) is to facilitate certifications
without an election when there is no real contest." This objective, however, is not served by permitting certification without an election where
35
there is a real contest.
Chairman Day's concern about the policies frustrated by SERB's
current interpretation of the voluntary recognition provisions is warranted. The prospects for amendment of the statutory language, however, are at best uncertain.3 6 But, this uncertainty need not thwart the
achievement of important goals.
This article will challenge SERB's interpretation of the procedural
requirements of sections 4117.05(A)(2) and 4117.07(A)(2) of the
OPECBA. It will examine analogous private sector law as an aid to the
proper interpretation of these provisions. Finally, this article will suggest an interpretation of the provisions that will achieve important policy objectives and obviate any revision of the statutory language.
II.
A.

REPRESENTATION QUESTIONS UNDER THE

NLRA

Language Under the NLRA and the OPECBA

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 7 has served as a
model for much of the comprehensive public sector labor relations leg32. Id.
33. Id. at 372-73; Knapp, O'Reilly & Sharpe, supra note 25, at 478.
34. Day, supra note 19, at 373.
35. Id.
36. This writer's pessimistic view about the prospects for an amendment is shared by Chairman Day and James T. O'Reilly. See Knapp, O'Reilly & Sharpe, supra note 25, at 473 (response
by SERB Chairman Jack G. Day). Besides Ohio, other states also have public sector statutes
containing similar voluntary recognition language. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.100(a)(B) (1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1606(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.14 (West
1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 4 (West 1982);
MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.9E (West 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-201 to -211
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:10 (Supp. 1983); N.Y. LAB. LAw § 705 (McKinney
1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.666 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 95.11 (Purdon 1964); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §9 60-9A-1 to -15 (1977).
37.eCommons,
29 U.S.C. 661985
151-16Q (IQR7
Published by
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islation, 38 including the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining
Act."9 Like many other public sector statutes, the OPECBA tracks
many of the representation provisions of the NLRA,'0 and specifically
incorporates the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) administratively promulgated "showing of interest" rule."'

38. H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
112-16, 160-61 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as H. EDWARDS].
39. J. O'REILLY, OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 11-12 (1984).
40. H. EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 160.
41. Early in its existence the NLRB ruled that a union, an individual, an employee, or a
group of employees must demonstrate that 30% of the employees in an appropriate unit desire
representation by the union before the NLRB would authorize an election. Statement of Procedures, Ser. 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1984). This rule is not expressly embodied in the NLRA, but
implements the statutory provision calling for a showing of substantial employee interest as a
precondition to the NLRB's further investigation of any question concerning representation. See
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982). The OPECBA specifically incorporates this NLRB administrative
rule. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1984). Beyond this administrative
variation, the NLRA and the OPECBA are virtually identical in relevant parts. Section 9(c)(1) of
the NLRA states:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed; in accordance with such regulations as may
be prescribed by the Board(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish
to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section, or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified
or is being currently recognized by the their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in subsection (a) of this section; or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in
subsection (a) of this section;
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the
regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board
finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall
direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982).
Section 4117.07(A) of the OPECBA provides:
When a petition is filed, in accordance with rules prescribed by the state employment
relations board:
(1) By any employee or group of employees, or any individual or employee organization acting in their behalf, alleging that at least thirty percent of the employees in an
appropriate unit wish to be represented for collective bargaining by an exclusive representative, or asserting that the designated exclusive representative is no longer the representative of the majority of employees in the unit, the board shall investigate the petition, and if
it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation exists, provide for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice to the parties;
(2) By the employer alleging that one or more employee organizations has presented
to it a claim to be recognized as the exclusive representative in an appropriate unit, the
board shall investigate the petition, and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question
of representation exists, provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice to the parties.
If the board finds upon the record of a hearing that a question of representation exists,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/3
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While there are provisions of the OPECBA which address the peculiar problems of public sector collective bargaining and have no analogue in the NLRA,' 2 the OPECBA representation provisions are
equally applicable in both the public and private sector. Because the
language of these common provisions 43 expresses well-settled rules governing the filing of election petitions and the securing of officially-supervised elections, SERB and the Ohio judiciary can profitably examine NLRB and federal judicial interpretation of NLRA rules for
guidance in interpreting analogous OPECBA provisions.
B.

Procedures and Employer Petitions

Pursuant to section 9(c) of the NLRA, a number of factors may
foreclose the finding of a question of representation. 4' Employee interest in union representation may not be substantial enough to warrant
the use of NLRB election machinery, or to justify the workplace disruption produced by an election campaign.45 The employee unit named
in the petition may be inappropriate for purposes of collective bargaining. 46 The petition may be untimely because it is barred by an election
that occurred within the preceding twelve months,'47 the employer is

party to an effective contract with another union,'48 or another certi-

it shall direct an election and certify the results thereof.
§ 4117.07(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
Other jurisdictions with statutes specifically incorporating the 30% showing of interest requirement are as follows: ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.100 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1305
(1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-618.10 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.307(2) (West 1981); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 89-7 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1609(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 20.14(2)(b) (West 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327(d) (1984); MIcH. COMp.
LAWS § 423.212(a) (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.10(3) (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE
39 3 2
ANN. §
- 1- 07(l)(a) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-838(3) (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
273-A:10(l)(a) (Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.603(a) (Purdon Supp. 1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1584(a) (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.83(5) (West 1974). Rhode Island
only requires a 20% showing of interest. R.I. GEN. LAWs § 28-9.4-6 (1979).
42. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.06 (Page Supp. 1984) (unit determination); id.
§ 4117.08 (scope of bargaining); id. § 4117.09(B)(2) (deduction of dues); id. § 4117.10 (scope of
agreement); id. § 4117.14 (resolution of disputes); id. § 4117.15 (strikes). See also Sharpe, The
Ohio Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law: First Anniversary Colloquium, 35 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 345 (1986).
43. See supra note 41.
44. See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
320-27, 370-74 (9th ed. 1981). [hereinafter cited as A. Cox].
45. In order for there to be a question of representation, thus requiring the use of election
machinery, the petitioning unit must have been designated by at least 30% of the employees.
Statements of Procedure, Ser. 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1985). See also 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)
(1982) (petitioning unit must allege the support of a substantial number of employees).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982); Statements of Procedure, Ser. 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a)
(1985).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982).
48. eCommons,
See Statements
of Procedure, Ser. 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(b) (1985); See also Reed
Published by
1985
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fled 4 9 or recognized majority representative exists.50 The NLRB also
may decline to proceed to an election due -to a pending unfair labor
practice charge, 51 the size of the employer, or the nature of the employees, employer, or union.52 On the other hand, absent all of these procedural bars, a question of representation may exist for NLRB resolution.
The foregoing factors for determining a question of representation combine to conserve administrative resources, promote stable collective bargaining relationships, and permit election campaign-induced disruption
in the workplace only for significant representational disputes. 3
1. Showing of Interest
Unions whose petitions are not untimely, obstructed by pending
unfair labor practice charges or jurisdictional problems, or frustrated
by inappropriate unit descriptions may still fail to establish a question
of representation under the NLRA. Early in its institutional life, the
NLRB promulgated a "showing of interest" rule to further the statutory objective of resolving only significant representational disputes.54
As a condition to further investigation of the question of representation,
the showing of interest rule requires a union to produce evidence-usually authorization cards 55-indicating that thirty percent of
the employees in an appropriate unit have designated the union as their
collective bargaining representative. 6
Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 927 (1947).
49. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
50. See Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966).
51. A. Cox, supra note 44, at 262; K. McGUINESS, How TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD § 7-3, at 107 (4th ed. 1976).
52. A. Cox, supra note 44, at 89-90 (listing of NLRB-promulgated jurisdictional standards); 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3), (5) (1982) (definitions of employees, employer, and union). See
also 29 U.S.C. § 152(6)-(7) (1982) (definitions of commerce and affecting commerce); id. §
159(c)(1) (authorizing the NLRB to investigate petitions in order to determine the existence of a
question of representation); id. § 160(a) (general power of the NLRB to prevent a person from
engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce); Rules and Regulations, Ser. 8. 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.18 (1985) (investigation of petition).
53. See R. GORMAN, supra note 45, at 52-59. It should be noted that public sector statutes
typically make the question of representation a function of the same factors. See generally H.
EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 160-82.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982); Statements of Procedure, Ser. 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a)
(1985). See 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 15, 16 n.7 (1945).
55. See K. McGuINESS, supra note 51, § 5-20, at 66-67.
56. NLRB Statements of Procedure make it clear that the showing of interest rule is imposed on the employer and not the union when the employer files a petition. Statements of Procedure, Ser. 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1985).
The NLRB investigates the showing of interest administratively in order to protect employees
from disclosure of their choices concerning representation. NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., 201 F.2d 597,
600 (9th Cir. 1953). In upholding this administrative practice against employer challenge, the
Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit said that it saw nothing in § 9(c)(1) of the NLRA that
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/3
purported to make proof of substantial union interest an element in determining whether a ques-
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Employers may also initiate representation proceedings by filing
petitions pursuant to section 9(c)(1)(B) when unions demand recognition.5 7 An employer is not required to make a showing of interest, nor
need the union demonstrate a showing of interest, when the employer
files a petition under this section.5 8 But how is the NLRB to determine
whether an election would serve a statutory purpose when the employer, rather than the union, files the petition and unlike the union,
the employer, as petition initiator, need not show substantial employee
interest justifying an election? The prima facie inequality of this procedure seems all the more suspect when one considers that section
9(c)(1) requires that the NLRB find a question of representation
before directing an election, 59 and that section 9(c)(2) requires the
equal treatment of all petitioners.6 °
The question of whether an employer must show substantial employee interest was the subject of an early NLRB debate in Felton Oil

tion of representation exists. Id. at 600. The employer had argued that the wording of § 9(c)(1)
precluded an NLRB determination on the existence of a question of representation unless the
record at the hearing contained evidence demonstrating that the union represented a substantial
number of employees. Id. at 598.
Before a change of policy in 0. D. Jennings & Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 516 (1946), the showing of
interest was subject to being proven at the hearing. See Brad Foote Gear Works, Inc., 60 N.L.R.B.
97 (1945). Furthermore, the administrative and party protection policies advanced by the question
of representation requirement clearly encompass the showing of interest rule. It is not surprising,
then, that the NLRB's administrative pronouncements make it clear that the showing of interest
is necessary to establishing a question of representation. Statements of Procedure, Ser. 8, 29
C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1985). Specifically, the NLRB regulations provide that a petition may be
withdrawn on the initiative of the petitioner if the investigation discloses no question of representation, because:
[A]mong other possible reasons, the unit is not appropriate, or a written contract precludes
further investigation at that time, or where the petitioner is a labor organization or a person seeking decertification and the showing of representation among the employees is insufficient to warrant an election under the 30-percent principle stated in paragraph (a) of this
section.
Id. § 101.18(b).
The special treatment given the showing of interest element of the question of representation
is justified by the important policy of preserving employee free choice, and not by the notion that
the substantiality of employee interest in representation is not a factor in determining whether a
question of representation exists.
Other methods of proving the showing of interest are dues checkoff lists, employee petitions,
and membership rolls. A. Cox, supra note-44, at 261.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1982). Before the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner
Act, an employer was permitted to file a petition only when confronted by recognition claims from
two or more unions. See R. GORMAN, supra note 44, at 41-42.
58. Statements of Procedure, Ser. 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1985).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982). See supra note 41.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(2) (1982). This section states in relevant part: "In determining
whether or not a question of representation affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and
rules of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind
of relief
sought.
...1985
Id.
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Co.6 1 The Felton Oil majority noted the absence of any substantial interest requirement in the language of section 9(c)(1)(B) as well as the
practical difficulties that an employer would have in meeting such a
requirement. 61 The NLRB concluded that section 9(c)(1)(B) manifested Congress' intent to provide employers who were confronted with
recognition demands with an unfettered NLRB election procedure to
ascertain the representative status of unions.6 The majority was not
dissuaded by the "equal treatment" language of section 9(c)(2), because explicit legislative history indicated that the purpose of that provision was to prevent more favorable treatment to affiliated unions than
to independent unions."'
The dissent argued that Congress' concern about frivolous petitions filed by employees, labor organizations, or employers was embodied in the section 9(c) pre-election requirements that the existence of
questions of representation be investigated and heard before an election
was directed.6 5 Thus, in determining the existence of questions of representation, the NLRB's use of a double standard-one for unions and a
different one for employers--disregarded an important congressionallyrecognized interest in avoiding the expenditure of government funds for
unwarranted elections. 66 The dissent further argued that the majority
rule invited unscrupulous employers to thwart collective bargaining by
colluding with unprincipled unions to make recognition demands that
would invariably lead to employer-won elections. 67 The election bar
rule would then preclude employees from voting for a true representative for one year.6 8 The dissent dismissed the practical difficulty of an
employer showing of interest requirement, arguing that it would be easily solvable by requiring the demanding union to meet this burden or
face an adverse finding on the issue of majority status.6 9

61. 78 N.L.R.B. 1033 (1948).
62. Id. at 1035. Prominent among such difficulties would be a union's noncooperation in
showing evidence of its representational status, its failure to petition for an election, and the risk
of exposure to unfair labor practice liability when an employer must ascertain employee sentiments. Id. at 1035 n.5.
63. Id.at 1036.
64. Id. at 1035 n.5.
65. Id. at 1038 (Murdock, M., dissenting).
66. See id. at 1038-40.
67. Id. at 1041.
68. Id.The election bar rule is contained in § 9(c)(3) of the NLRA which reads in relevant
part: "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the
preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3)
(1982).
69. Felton Oil, 78 N.L.R.B. at 1042 (Murdock, M., dissenting).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/3
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The Majority Claim

The NLRB has continued to follow the Felton Oil majority interpretation of an employer-petitioner's burden under sections 9(c)(1) and
(2) of the NLRA. 7 0 Pivotal to the employer's demonstrating a question
of representation under section 9(c)(1)(B) is the showing that the employer has been presented with a claim for recognition as majority representative by one or more individuals or labor organizations. 71
The NLRA's requirement that an employer's petition be based on
a union's majority claim partially addresses the Felton Oil dissent's
concern about an unscrupulous employer's illegitimate precipitation of
the statute's election bar in order to thwart legitimate employee representational interest.72 The legislative history of section 9(c)(1)(B)
reveals that the majority claim requirement seeks to prevent an employer from causing a premature election, and the subsequent bar, by
filing a petition before the union has had an opportunity to organize. 73
It does not, however, prevent an employer from colluding with the unprincipled union to precipitate a premature election with the same election bar consequences. 74 While such employer-union conspiracies may
have been a major concern in 1935, 75 when the NLRA was enacted,
they did not move the Felton Oil majority in 1948. There is no evidence that such improbable conspiracies should preoccupy current in7
terpreters of statutory procedural provisions.
If the majority claim requirement only partially answers the dis70. See Hooker Electrochemical Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1393, 1394 n.3 (1956); Statements of
Procedure, Ser. 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1985).
71. See Albuquerque Insulation Contractor, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 61 (1981). In that case, the
union requested that the employer sign a pre-hire agreement under § 8(f) of the NLRA. Id. As a
concession to the peculiarities of the construction industry, § 8(f) permits construction industry
employers to enter into agreements with non-majority unions as a limited exception to the statutory principle of majority rule. The NLRB found that the union's request did not constitute a
request for recognition as majority representative. Id. at 63. But cf. Robert Tires, 212 N.L.R.B.
405 (1974) (union's picketing of a successor employer to sign a predecessor contract was deemed
a demand for recognition). See also Ogden Enterprises, Ltd., 248 N.L.R.B. 290 (1980) (NLRB
held that the union's picketing was recognitional in spite of a disclaimer that the picketing was
directed only to the public); McClintock Market, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 555 (1979) (NLRB held the
union's picketing to be recognitional, thus raising a question of representation). In Malcom X
Center'for Mental Health, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 944, 947 (1976), the employer showed a question of
representation even though the union had won an election where the election certified the union in
an inappropriate unit.
72. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
73. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HisTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407, 417.
74. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
75. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA was spawned by this kind of concern. See 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(2) (1982). See also Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section
8(a)(2), 82 YALE L.J. 510, 511-16 (1973).
See Note, supra
note 75, at 511-16.
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sent's concern that the election bar may be triggered improperly, it
fully satisfies the dissent's administrative resources conservation argument.7 7 The demand for recognition contemplated by section
9(c)(l)(B) is that made by a union asserting majority status. 8 Such a
demand is normally made as a prelude to petitioning the NLRB to
conduct an election on the assumption that the employer will refuse the
demand.7 9 Pursuant to section 9(c)(1)(A), the petitioning union, as a
threshold matter, must make a showing of interest demonstrating the
existence of a question of representation.8" It has been well documented
that unions typically do not settle for the thirty percent minimum
showing of interest required by the NLRB when filing petitions; rather,
unions solicit the signatures of fifty to one hundred percent of the
targeted employees before filing an election petition. 81 These factors
erase any question that where an employer can show a union's demand
for recognition as "majority" representative, the interest is present to
justify the NLRB's expenditure of resources and the election-related
disruption of the workplace.
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR OHIO'S VOLUNTARY

RECOGNITION

PROCEDURES

Theoretically, even when an employer files a timely and unencumbered election petition to test the union's majority status following a
union's request for voluntary recognition, alternative circumstances
might lead to a finding that there is 'no question of representation.
First, the showing of interest may be insufficient to raise a significant
question of representation. Second, the evidence of majority support
may be so convincing that it leaves no reasonable question of representation. Empirical evidence and well-settled experience in the private
sector indicate that neither circumstance exists when the Ohio Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Act's voluntary recognition procedures
lead to an employer petition. 85

77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
78. A "representative," as defined in § 9(a), is an entity that has been designated by a
majority of the employees as their bargaining representative. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). It should
be noted that an employer may not lawfully recognize a union which represents only a minority of
employees as an exclusive representative. See, e.g., ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (§
8(a)(2) violation).
79. A. Cox, supra note 44, at 112, 260.
80. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
81. See Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776 n.22 (1983). See also K. McGUINESS, supra note 51, §
5-18, at 63-66.
82. As indicated previously, most unions will solicit the signatures of 50% to 100% of the
targeted employees, thus raising a significant question of representation. See supra note 81 and
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/3
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A. The Ohio Statute's Peculiar Twist in Voluntary Recognition
Cases
The debate by members of the NLRB in Felton Oil Co. 83 is statutorily resolved by voluntary recognition procedures that give rise to employer election petitions pursuant to the OPECBA. A labor organization seeking voluntary recognition in the Ohio public sector must file a
request with the public employer and provide a copy of the request to
the State Employment Relations Board.8 The union must allege majority support and produce substantial evidence to support the allegation. 85 Substantial evidence usually consists of union authorization
cards which are filed only with SERB.86 When a request for voluntary
recognition is filed, the employer must either post a prescribed notice at
each relevant facility and notify SERB of the request for recognition,
or it must petition for an election.8 7 These rules contemplate employer
petitions that will be precipitated by demonstrated majority employee
interest sufficient to warrant the campaign-induced expenditure of
SERB resources and disruption of the workplace.
The OPECBA's voluntary recognition procedures, which permit
certification upon non-election evidence of majority support, 88 are not
open the question of representation. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
83. 78 N.L.R.B. 1033 (1948). For a discussion of this debate, see supra notes 61-69 and
accompanying text.
84. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
85. Id. The union must also describe the bargaining unit. Id.
86. See OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 4117-3-03 (1984). Section 4117-3-03 states:
(A) For the purposes of division (A)(2), (A)(2)(b)(ii), and (A)(2)(b)(iii) of section
4117.05 of the Revised Code, and rules 4117-3-01 and 4117-3-02 of the Administrative
Code, "substantial evidence" shall consist of the following documentation that shall be filed
only with the board:
(I) Original signed and dated statements, including but not limited to cards and petitions, that clearly set forth the intent of the employee with respect to representation by the
employee organization; or
(2) Dues deduction authorizations or dues deduction lists in effect as of the payroll
period immediately preceding the filing of the request for recognition with the employer.
(B) For the purpose of division (A)(2)(b)(iv) of section 4117.05 of the Revised Code,
"substantial evidence" shall consist of a clear and concise statement of the reason the unit
is not appropriate, such statement to be supported by documentation relating to the factors
set forth in section 4117.06 of the Revised Code.
Id.
87. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(a)-(b)(l) (Page Supp. 1984). The notice must
describe the bargaining unit, provide the name of the union requesting recognition, and give the
date of the request. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(a). Furthermore, the notice must advise employees that
objections to certification must be filed with SERB no later than 21 days after the request for
recognition. Id. The posting of a notice does not preclude the employer from also petitioning for
election within 21 days following the union's voluntary recognition request. OHIO ADMIN. CODE §
4117-3-01(D) (1984).
88. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984). See supra notes 4-11 and
accompanying
text. 1985
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found in the NLRA and are unique among public sector statutes.8 The
more important question to be asked here is not whether there is sufficient interest'to raise a question of representation; 90 rather, one should
ask whether the question of representation has been settled by the

union's evidence of majority support. Moreover, if a union demonstrates its majority status to SERB by substantial evidence as required
under section 4117.05, and there is no reason to doubt the authenticity
and validity of this evidence, is there a "question of representation"
that warrants the expenditure of SERB resources and disruption of the
workplace? 91 In FranklinSchool District Board of Education,9 2 SERB
said no, 93 effectively finding union authorization cards to be determinative of majority status. That decision ignores well-settled experience
under the NLRA and important policy concerns.
B.

The Reliability of Card-Based Majorities Under the NLRA

It has been said that the presentation of union authorization cards,
as reliable evidence of the union's representational status among employees, is merely a cut above an employer's request for a "show of
hands. '94 While this assessment may be a somewhat humorous overstatement, it possesses more than a kernel of truth. 93 The primary de-

89. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text; see also infra note 105.
90. See North Canton City Schools, 2 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 2638 (1985);
Cleveland School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 2 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 2083 (1985). These
cases hold that a petition filed by a rival union supports a good faith doubt, justifying an employer's withdrawal of recognition from an incumbent union. North Canton, 2 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP)
2638, at VII-45; Cleveland School Dist., 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP.
(LRP) T 2083, at VII-63. If cards establishing the 30% showing of interest are sufficient to disrupt
an established collective bargaining relationship, certainly the same kind of evidence showing majority support raises a question concerning representation.
91. Note that this question focuses on the "substantial interest" factor and not other factors, such as unit propriety, which could also raise a question of representation.
92. 1 OHIo PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. 1 1308 (1984).
93. Id. 1 1308, at VII-233.
94. NLRB v. S. S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1967).
95. For the past two decades the question of authorization card reliability has been extensively debated in federal cases and scholarly literature. For a review of commentary urging regulation of union authorization card solicitation, see Browne, Obligation to Bargain on Basis of Card
Majority, 3 GA. L. REv. 334 (1969); Gruender & Prince, Union Authorization Cards: Why Not
Laboratory Conditions?, 32 LAB. L.J. 13 (1981); Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights
Without an NLRB Election, 65 MICH. L. REV. 851 (1967); Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75
YALE L.J. 805 (1966). For a review of commentary acknowledging elections as preferred, but
pointing out the superior reliability of authorization cards in some situations, see Browne, supra at
348; Lesnick, supra, at 863-68; Scheinkman, Recognition of Unions Through Authorization
Cards, 3 GA. L. REV. 319, 327-33 (1969). See also Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v.
NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Aaron Bros.,
158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); Gordon, Union Authorization Cards and the Duty to Bargain, 19 LAB.
L.J. 201 (1968). There is statistical support for the unreliability of authorization cards relative to
NLRB-conducted elections. In a 1962 address to the American Bar Association, former NLRB
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/3
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fect in card authorizations is that they are solicited in a short period of
time, often unbeknownst to the employer, thereby precluding the employer from presenting its views and denying employees full exposure to
counter arguments on the union question.96 Employee sentiments, as
reflected in authorizations cards, therefore, are likely to be made without the amount of information necessary to make a fully-informed
choice. Moreover, the process by which the authorization cards are
solicited is much less likely to come under NLRB scrutiny than election campaign behavior where the NLRB insists on the preservation of
' 97
"laboratory conditions.
A second major problem with authorization cards is that employees often sign the cards for reasons unrelated to a desire for union representation, yet their signatures suffice to demonstrate their support for
the union and may actually be counted as a vote for the union. 8 Under

Chairman McCulloch stated:
In 58 elections, the unions presented authorization cards from 30 to 50 [%] of the employees; and they won I I or 19% of them. In 87 elections, the unions presented authorization
cards from 50 to 70 [%] of the employees-and they won 42 or 52% of them. In 57 elections, the unions presented authorization cards from over 70% of the employees, and they
won 42 or 74% of them.
McCulloch, A Tale of Two Cities: Or Law in Action, 1962 A.B.A. SEc. LAB. REL. LAW 14, 17.
Furthermore, in rival union situations it is not uncommon to find competing unions with
authorization card majorities in the same unit. See Abraham Grossman, 262 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982).
96. Note, supra note 95, at 823-28. Section 8(c) of the NLRA guarantees private sector
employers the right to present non-coercive views, arguments, and opinions with respect to employee organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982). Similarly, public employers do not commit an
unfair labor practice under the OPECBA by expressing non-coercive views, arguments, and opinions on employee organization, as such actions are not prohibited. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4117.11 (A)(1) (Page Supp. 1984).
97. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). Under some NLRB majorities, the "laboratory conditions" rule has involved regulating some misrepresentations made during the campaign. See General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). But see Midland Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). The prohibition on captive audience speeches within 24 hours of
the election is also an effort to preserve laboratory conditions by preventing last minute claims
that cannot be refuted during an election campaign. See Peerless Plywood, 107 N.L.R.B. 427
(1953). But see Lesnick, supra note 95, at 859-68 (urging the policing of union authorization
card solicitation while demythologizing the sacrosanctity of NLRB-conducted elections). See also
Weiler, supra note 81, at 1781-86 (description of the debate on the impact of campaign tactics on
voter behavior).
98. Most union authorization cards specifically authorize a particular union to act as the
signers' bargaining agent. See, e.g., Levi-Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 732 (1968). Some authorization cards contain language about using the card to secure an NLRB-conducted election. See,
e.g., Lenz Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1399 (1965). There is evidence that employees often do not read such
cards carefully and may not fully understand their significance. See Gruender & Prince, supra
note 95, at 19.
Even where the language indicates only the authorization purpose, it may be effectively canceled by contemporaneous statements made by the union solicitor to the prospective card signer.
See Holding Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 383, 399-400 (1977) (employees were told that the card would be
used to get an election). NLRB decisions prevent the most egregious form of misrepresentation
where employees are told
Published by eCommons, 1985that the card will be used only to secure an election. See, e.g., Levi-
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the OPECBA's voluntary recognition provisions, authorization cards
will count as evidence of union majority support unless the employer
petitions for an election. 99 By contrast, voters in an NLRB- or a
SERB-conducted election can have no question about the effect of their
ballots.
In the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act, Congress expressed a clear preference for NLRB-conducted elections as a means of
resolving representation questions while preserving the legality of cardbased recognition.10 0 Congress made the NLRB-conducted election the
sole basis for union certification and gave certified unions special privileges under the NLRA. 10 ' Recognizing the relative unreliability of authorization cards as a measure of majority sentiment, the NLRB, in
1966, relieved employers of having to establish a good faith doubt of an
authorization card-based majority claim before insisting on an election.102 Rather than recognize a union making a card-based demand for
recognition, a private sector employer may do nothing and force a
union to petition the NLRB for an election under the NLRA.10° The
employer may insist on an election to determine the status of the union,
even though it has no doubt about the validity of cards supporting the
demand. 1 0 These procedures reflect congressional, judicial, and administrative deference to the superior attributes of officially-supervised
elections.
C. Card Reliability and the Ohio Voluntary Recognition Procedure
While more subtle, the Ohio General Assembly's judgment about

Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 732 (1968); Cumberland Shoe, 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963). But representations short of this extreme, including misrepresentations about the number of signatories
among the prospective signer's fellow employees, will not invalidate the card. See, e.g., Roney
Plaza Apartments, 232 N.L.R.B. 409 (1977). For these reasons many employees actually sign
cards because "everyone else has signed," id. at 416; to "scare" the employer into granting a wage
increase, NLRB v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 1964); to get an election, Holding Co.,
231 N.L.R.B. at 400; and to get the union to come in and explain its program, Kolpin Bros., 149
N.L.R.B. 1378 (1964). See generally Browne, supra note 95.
99. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(i) (Page Supp. 1984).
100. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407, 428-29, 431.
101. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 598-99 (1969). Certified unions enjoy
special protection against recognitional picketing by rival unions, special protection in jurisdictional disputes, and recognitional as well as organizational picketing. See id. at 599 n.14. Certified
unions, for example, also generally enjoy a longer period of insulation from challenges to their
majority status by employers and rival employee groups. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96
(1954).
102. Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966). See Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 590-95
(review of the history of the "good faith doubt" doctrine).
103. Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. at 1078.
104. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1974).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/3
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the superiority of officially-conducted elections is similar to Congress'
and is discernable by careful analysis. The OPECBA permits certification of a union on the basis of an election or other evidence of majority
support, such as authorization cards. 10 5 At the same time, the
OPECBA gives an employer the right to petition for an election in language identical to the analogous section of the NLRA.' 06 This right
must be exercised in order to avoid certification when the union cards
are valid and there is no majority showing contra representation, no
rival union, and no unit problems.10 7 This procedure acknowledges the
potential existence of a representation question, even when an employer
is presented with a card-based request for recognition.
The concurrence of sections 4117.05(A)(2) and 4117.07(A)(2) in
the OPECBA must be reconciled. The inference seems evident that the
Ohio General Assembly deemed authorization cards to be reliable
enough to warrant an employer's petitioning for an election, if the employer is to simultaneously refuse recognition and avoid unfair labor
practice liability, but not as reliable as an election should the employer
deem one necessary.10 8 That this is the appropriate reading of the statute is apparent when the private sector experience is factored into the
analysis.
The legislative judgment that authorization cards are sufficiently

105. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b) (Page Supp. 1984). Of the 26 comprehensive statutes that regulate public employee collective bargaining in 25 states and the District of
Columbia, many permit voluntary recognition. See supra note 36. However, besides Ohio, only
Minnesota and Pennsylvania permit certification on the basis of authorization cards. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 179.12(2) (West Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 95.11 (Purdon 1964).
Furthermore, Minnesota and Pennsylvania allow such certification only upon a joint request for
certification to the government entity, while the Ohio statute forces the employer to file a petition
to avoid certification. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.12(2) (West Supp. 1985); OHIO REV.CODE
ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2)(b)(1) (Page Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 95.11 (Purdon 1964).
106. See supra note 41.
107. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(ii)-(iv) (Page Supp. 1984).
108. In a voluntary recognition situation the statute contemplates that SERB will be guided
by the employer's initiative in testing doubts about the union's majority status. SERB is not otherwise likely to have doubts and apparently does not have the authority to initiate an election sua
sponte. The employer, on the other hand, can test such doubts by petitioning for an officiallyconducted election. Section 4117.05(A)(2), which permits certification upon a request for voluntary recognition, was also in an earlier form of the statute vetoed by Gov. James Rhodes. Telephone interview with Richard Masek, Chief of the Commerce, Labor, and General Development
Division of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, formerly Staff Member to the House Commerce & Labor Commission, Columbus, Ohio (Aug. 1, 1985). Generally, the voluntary recognition provision removes the election route to certification where the employer does not question the
union's status and wants to start the collective bargaining relationship with the union on the
"right foot." Id. Specifically, Ohio's unique "certification" in the voluntary recognition procedure
works to standardize the recognition process. Id. Through this provision unions that are recognized
voluntarily are specifically intended to enjoy no lesser prestige than one that is recognized after an
election. Id. Such standardization is intended to produce uniformly effective collective bargaining.
Id. by eCommons, 1985
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reliable to support a bargaining obligation without an election is also
apparent under the NLRA. 1°9 The United States Supreme Court has
held that bargaining orders are an appropriate remedy for pervasive
unfair labor practices committed by the employer during private sector
election campaigns. 110 In that situation, authorization cards, rather
than a tainted election, are considered a more reliable indicator of employee free choice."' Otherwise, elections are a preferred means of determining employee sentiment.
While authorization cards may be reliable enough to force an employer to invoke SERB's superior processes, and even more reliable
than an officially-supervised election in special circumstances,"1 2 the
cards are not sufficiently decisive to remove a reasonable question of
representation. Needless to say, "some evidence" of majority status
supplied by valid authorization cards and "conclusive proof" provided
by a SERB-conducted election meet substantially different standards of
certainty in addressing questions of representation. The former leaves
considerable doubt on the question of representation; the latter usually
leaves none. Authorization cards necessarily leave the question of representation unresolved and should entitle the petitioning employer to an
election under the OPECBA.
The foregoing observations are not intended to impugn the certification of Ohio public sector unions based on the statute's voluntary
recognition procedures. On the contrary, while unique, the Ohio voluntary recognition procedures have led to the expeditious settling of rep-

109. See Abraham Grossman, 262 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982). In that case, the NLRB held authorization cards to be reliable enough to create a foundation for recognizing and bargaining with
a union unless a valid petition for an election is filed by a rival union. Id. at 958.
110. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 602.
I11. Id. at 601-10, 614-15. Indeed, without benefit of the similar but clearer language of
the OPECBA, § 9(c)(1)(B) of the NLRA had been interpreted as imposing an obligation upon
the employer to petition for an election when presented a valid card-based majority demand for
recognition. In Truck Drivers Local No. 413 v. NLRB., 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd
sub nom. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974), the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
While we have indicated that cards alone, or recognitional strikes and ambiguous utterances of the employer, do not necessarily provide such "convincing evidence of majority
support" so as to require a bargaining order, they certainly create a sufficient probability of
majority support as to require an employer asserting a doubt of majority status to resolve
the possibility through a petition for an election, if he is to avoid [a] duty to bargain . ...
Id. at I I 11. Disagreeing with the United States Supreme Court majority in the Linden Lumber
reversal, Justice Stewart, writing for four dissenting Justices, adopted the D.C. Circuit's view of
an employer's obligation to petition for an election when faced with a card-based demand for
recognition. 419 U.S. 301, 316-17 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). This view was, of course,
rejected by the Linden Lumber majority. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
112. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984) (provides for the Gissel-type remedy, where SERB determines that a free and untrammeled election cannot be held
because of the employer's unfair labor pratices).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/3
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resentation disputes and have facilitated the onset of constructive relationships between public sector unions and employers. Indeed, a survey
of the voluntary recognition cases decided by SERB since its effective
date of operation shows that, in the overwhelming majority of cases,
recognition is granted upon request without objection or employer petition.113 The Ohio voluntary recognition procedures are obviously working well in the vast majority of cases where the employer has no reason
to doubt the union's claim of majority status.' 1 4 However, where there
is doubt, the testing of the union's majority by an officially-supervised
election serves the interests of the union and the employer, while also
advancing the statutory goal of encouraging stable and effective collective bargaining relationships.11 5 In the absence of a reliable determination of representation questions, employers who suspect union weakness
will be less willing to commit serious effort to collective bargaining,
while insecure unions will bargain with little confidence or effectiveness. Furthermore, neither the union's nor the employer's interests are
served by the protracted litigation that could result from a SERB investigation of an employer's petition under the current interpretation of
section 4117.07(A)(2). The union must forego a possible early election
victory that could prevent the dissipation of union bargaining strength.
The employer, on the other hand, must shoulder the difficult and expensive burden of persuading SERB that the union's majority claim is
16
without foundation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Questions of representation exist whenever there is substantial employee interest in organizing that is ripe for testing by some accurate
measure of employee sentiment. There is virtually unanimous agreement that the most accurate testing device is the officially-supervised
election.111 Evidence of majority support generated in one-sided campaigns without a full airing of countervailing views is likely to be less

113. See generally 2 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) VI-1, VI-34 to -41 (Cumulative
Digest of Cases-Headnotes 32.9-.92); 1 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) VI-1, Vl-74 to -83
(Cumulative Digest of Cases-Headnotes 32.91-.92).
114. Compare the observations of Ronald Janetske that often the parties engage in protracted negotiations before a voluntary recognition is concluded. Telephone interview with Ronald
Janetzke, General Counsel, AFSCME Ohio Council 8, Columbus, Ohio (July 23, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Janetske interview].
115. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01(G), 4117.07(C)(6), 4117.11(A)(5),
4117.1 l(B)(3) (Page Supp. 1984). These sections advance the values of effective and stable collective bargaining relationships.
116. Recognizing their mutual interests in these circumstances, the parties sometimes agree
to a consent election on the heels of an employer petition pursuant to § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(i) of the
Ohio Revised Code. Janetzke interview, supra note 114.
117.eCommons,
See supra notes
Published by
1985100-04 and accompanying text.
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reliable." 8 Where employee sentiment has been registered by non-election means, questions concerning true employee sentiment on the issue
of representation are necessarily unresolved. Thus, majority support is
not conclusively demonstrated and a question of representation remains
when a union requesting voluntary recognition submits valid evidence
of majority support to SERB.
On the other hand, such evidence does create a question of representation which justifies a SERB-directed election. Thus, the employer
should meet its burden of proving the existence of a question of representation under section 4117.07(A)(2) when it shows that the union
has made a claim for voluntary recognition pursuant to section
4117.05(A)(2). Such an interpretation reconciles statutory provisions
defining Ohio voluntary recognition procedures and conforms to national labor policy articulated in federal administrative and judicial decisions. It advances the benign policies of protecting union authorization cards from disclosure while giving employers an opportunity to
challenge the union's status where there is doubt. And it obviates an
amendment to the existing language of the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act.

I 8. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/3

